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are published, for example public library 
materials such as self-help books, popular 
fiction and biography, etiquette, and other 
genres that later become invaluable sources 
for cultural historians.  
• What if we start down this road but find 
part-way there that the political will and/or 
financial resources necessary to do the job 
well are not forthcoming?
Other Big Questions 
Another facet of Curating the Collective Col-
lection will be thoughtful essays wrestling in a pub-
lic forum with some of the larger questions attendant 
to this remarkable conceptual and operational shift 
from managing individual institutional collections to 
reliance on a cooperatively curated, shared national 
collection.  Some of obvious questions include:
• What is the political economy of a national 
shared collection?  Who will own and have 
access to materials?  What are the long range 
cost and power implications of the structures 
we establish for sharing?  Who might be left 
out?  Will shared print archiving ameliorate 
or exacerbate inequitable access to scholarly 
materials?
• How can we build sustainable trust networks 
that will endure for generations?  
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• How do we coordinate shared print archiving 
nationally and internationally?
• What existing models outside librarianship 
and higher education might inform the 
development of the social and technical 
infrastructure?
• What voices outside librarianship need to be 
heard and what ideas and concerns need to be 
grappled with as we systematically and stra-
tegically (or not!) “drawdown” “redundant” 
library holdings? 
Invitation to Participate
While those already active in shared print ar-
chiving will read and contribute to this column, a 
primary purpose is to engage a broader spectrum 
of librarians in thinking about and discussing 
these issues.  You are invited to help shape this 
column by: 
• Offering opinions, ask questions and sug-
gest topics for articles.  Remember, please 
send me a note now suggesting three top-
ics you’d like to see covered in the year 
ahead. 
• Proposing to write or co-author articles on 
relevant issues about which you are passion-
ate and knowledgeable.  
• Commenting on and contributing to a pos-
sible Curating the Collective Collection 
blog.  
Stay tuned and be in touch!  
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Collecting to the Core — Financial Crises
by Peter Z. McKay  (Business Librarian, University of Florida Libraries; Economics Subject Editor,  
Resources for College Libraries)  <pzmckay@uflib.ufl.edu>
Column Editor:  Anne Doherty  (Resources for College Libraries Project Editor, CHOICE/ACRL)   
<adoherty@ala-choice.org>
In 1873 the British journalist, political com-mentator, and economist Walter Bagehot, the long-time editor of The Economist, 
published Lombard Street: A Description of 
the Money Market.2  At the time, London was 
the financial capital of the world and Lombard 
Street — home to the Bank of England, private 
banking houses, joint stock banks, and bill bro-
kers — was the epicenter of finance, much like 
today’s Wall Street.  Bagehot’s book was based 
on a series of essays published in The Economist 
beginning in the 1850s.  In addition to a lively 
portrait of the contemporary money market 
and leading personalities in mid-nineteenth 
century London, the book forcefully argued that 
the Bank of England must play the key role of 
lender of last resort in stemming a banking pan-
ic.  Today, Lombard Street is widely regarded 
as the original crisis management manual for 
central banks.  This essay discusses some of the 
fundamental works covering modern financial 
crises, from nineteenth-century Lombard Street 
to twenty-first century Wall Street.
Founded in 1694 to finance the War of the 
League of Augsburg against France, the Bank 
of England grew to become the de facto issuer 
of British currency and the country’s central 
bank.  In addition to its role as the government’s 
bank, it became the bankers’ bank and the 
keeper of Great Britain’s currency and reserves, 
colloquially coined “The Old Lady of Thread-
needle Street.”  When the British Parliament 
officially established the gold standard in 1821, 
the Bank of England was required to redeem 
all of its notes in gold on demand.  In contrast 
to today’s “fiat money” system whereby money 
has value based on government decree and is 
intrinsically useless, the Bank of England’s 
ability to create money was restricted since 
new note issues had to be backed by gold.  For 
a comprehensive history of gold and its role 
as both an economic unit and a mythologized 
object of human desire, see financial historian 
Peter Bernstein’s The Power of Gold: A His-
tory of an Obsession.3  While the Bank of 
England performed many public functions, such 
as establishing the gold-backed legal tender 
and purchasing government bonds, it remained 
privately owned.  There was an inherent conflict 
between its role as a private institution whose 
primary constituency was its shareholders and 
its public role to promote financial stability. 
In a crisis, the key question was whether the 
Bank of England would preserve the wealth of 
its private shareholders or help rival banks in 
order to preserve the public financial system. 
The nineteenth century saw frequent, frighten-
ing financial crises that intensified this tension. 
As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff 
chronicle in This Time Is Different: Eight Cen-
turies of Financial Folly, the United Kingdom 
alone experienced banking crises in 1810, 1815, 
1825, 1837, 1847, 1857, and 1866.4
These frequent financial crises highlight 
how the banking system functions as a con-
Column Editor’s Note:  The “Collecting to the Core” column highlights monographic 
works that are essential to the academic library within a particular discipline, inspired by 
the Resources for College Libraries bibliography (online at http://www.rclweb.net).  In each 
essay, subject specialists introduce and explain the classic titles and topics that continue to 
remain relevant to the undergraduate curriculum and library collection.  Disciplinary trends 
may shift, but some classics never go out of style. — AD
“Money will not manage itself, and Lombard Street has a great deal of 
money to manage.” — Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street1
fidence game, not in the traditional sense of a 
swindling operation, but in the sense that any 
bank’s soundness depends on the belief that a 
bank’s depositors and creditors can get their 
money at a moment’s notice.  Banks borrow 
for short periods and lend for long periods, 
profiting from the difference in the rate they 
pay to depositors and the rate they charge bor-
rowers.  Because of this, a modern bank will 
typically maintain only about ten percent of its 
assets in liquid securities such as United States 
Treasuries.  For every one dollar in reserves, a 
bank has nine dollars on loans to businesses 
and individuals.  Modern fractional reserve 
banking relies on public confidence that a 
depositor can obtain funds on a moment’s no-
tice.  During a banking crisis, credit contracts 
and players seek safety in cash or its nearest 
substitute. Historically, this has led to bank runs 
— a rush to withdraw cash that depletes banks’ 
cash reserves, causing banks to fail and credit 
markets to freeze.  Individuals and institutions 
acting rationally in their self-interest can cause 
the entire financial system to collapse, and the 
crisis becomes catastrophic.
Given the historical frequency of financial 
crises, there is much practical, as well as 
theoretical evidence to draw from.  In Lombard 
Street, Bagehot argued that in a financial cri-
sis the Bank of England must “... lend freely, 
boldly, and so that the public may feel you 
mean to go on lending,” even though “...the 
first instinct of everyone is to the contrary.”5 
His dictum flies in the face of the most basic 
economic survival instinct: preserve capital. 
The wisdom of Bagehot’s primary principle 
has been repeatedly proven in financial crises 
ever since.  In the classic work Manias, Panics 
and Crashes, first published in 1978 and now in 
its sixth edition, economic historian Charles P. 
Kindleberger reviews the anatomy of financial 
crises and thoroughly explores the concept 
of the lender of last resort, determining that 
“practice preceded theory.”6  The necessity for 
a lender of last resort in a crisis was born from 
repeated crises in the nineteenth century: “The 
lender of last resort stands ready to halt a run out 
of real and illiquid financial assets into money 
by making more money available.”7
The Panic of 1907: Lessons Learned from 
the Market’s Perfect Storm further illustrates 
the necessity of a lender of last resort.8  Au-
thors Bruner and Carr trace the origin of the 
1907 crisis to the San Francisco earthquake of 
April 18, 1906.  The earthquake damage and 
subsequent fires created a monumental re-
building effort that drew gold from the world’s 
financial centers and created a liquidity crisis. 
The authors argue that this shortage of cash for 
transactions and business loans caused a reces-
sion that started in June 1907.  At the time, the 
United States, like other major countries, was 
on the gold standard, which limited money 
creation.  Confidence was further eroded by 
Wall Street speculation and fraud.  The im-
mediate trigger for the crisis was the failure 
of the Knickerbocker Trust Company, one 
of the largest banks in the United States.  Its 
president, Charles T. Barney, had been using 
bank funds in an attempt to corner the market 
in copper.  When the scheme failed, the bank 
suffered large losses that caused a bank run and 
forced it into bankruptcy.  Doubts about the 
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soundness of other banks and trusts resulted 
in anxious depositors lining up to withdraw 
funds, causing more failures.  The money 
market froze, the stock market fell sharply, and 
the City of New York almost went bankrupt. 
This panic occurred in the National Banking 
Era, when the United States did not have a 
central bank that could lend freely and halt the 
panic.  The legendary John Pierpont Morgan 
organized a group of leading private bankers 
and financiers to put up enough money to stop 
the panic, effectively serving as the lender of 
last resort.  Perhaps ironically, the financial 
system in 1907 was saved by an ad hoc group 
of wealthy businessmen, and the crisis led to the 
establishment of a modern U.S. central bank in 
1913 — the Federal Reserve System.
The Great Depression shows what can 
happen when the lender of last resort fails to 
act forcefully enough.  Liaquat Ahamed’s 
Lords of Finance: The Bankers Who Broke the 
World won the Financial Times “Best Business 
Book of the Year” award in 2009.9  Ahamed 
recounts how mistakes made by the world’s 
leading central bankers — Montagu Norman 
of the Bank of England, Émile Moreau of 
the Banque de France, Hjalmar Schact of 
the Reichsbank, and Benjamin Strong of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York — led the 
world’s central banks to inadequately respond 
to the Great Depression.  Belief in and adher-
ence to the gold standard effectively handcuffed 
the central banks.  Ahamed notes: “They failed 
to fulfill even the most basic central banker’s 
responsibility: to act as lender of last resort and 
support the banking system at a time of panic.”10 
In their economic history of the Depression, The 
Great Contraction 1929-1933, Nobel Laure-
ate Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz 
wrote that Bagehot’s Lombard Street was “the 
locus classicus of central bank policy.”11  They 
conclude that the Federal Reserve could have 
greatly lessened the severity of the crisis had it 
fully embraced Bagehot’s principle.
However, the lender of last resort doctrine 
presents a paradox: if market participants are 
confident that the central bank will always 
introduce funds into the market during an 
economic crisis, then they are more likely to 
take on greater risks to generate higher returns, 
simultaneously producing the next financial 
crisis.  Economists call this condition, clearly 
illustrated during the recent financial crisis, 
“moral hazard.”  The Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Report explains how the large commercial 
and investment banks — Goldman Sachs, 
JP Morgan, Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns, 
Lehman Brothers, Citi, et al. — engineered 
the highly profitable mortgage-backed securi-
ties and their derivatives that fueled the housing 
boom, only to become toxic and poison the 
international financial system when the hous-
ing market collapsed in 2007 and many of the 
securities became worthless.12  Yet today, banks 
“too big to fail” are even bigger and the top 
executives are earning record bonuses while 
the global economy continues struggling to 
emerge from the worst recession since the 
Great Depression.
Bagehot’s principle that the central bank 
must lend freely in a financial crisis is the key 
to understanding how the Federal Reserve 
responded to the current economic conditions. 
As Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke 
noted in a 2008 speech given at the height 
of the crisis, “Walter Bagehot’s Lombard 
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Issues in Vendor/Library  
Relations — FOTB Tallahassee
Column Editor:  Bob Nardini  (Group Director, Client Integration and Head 
Bibliographer, Coutts Information Services)  <bnardini@couttsinfo.com>
When a call went out earlier this year inviting registrations, sponsor-ships, and papers for a conference 
called “Future of the Book,” in no time most 
of the back-and-forth email messages settling 
the details had shorthanded that down to 
“FOTB.”  Some acronyms are just naturals. 
FOTB sounded like a few others already in 
circulation, and it stuck. 
FOTB took place in Tallahassee, Florida, 
which might not seem like a place where 
you could work out the book’s future.  It’s 
the state capital, but who thinks about “Tal-
lahassee,” unblessed as it is by beaches or by 
Disney attractions, when Florida comes up 
in conversation?  Who considers Tallahassee 
the jewel even of the Florida Panhandle, the 
long, narrow strip of northwest Florida that 
runs west into Mobile, Alabama, and the 
site of sunny destinations like Pensacola and 
Panama City?  Tallahassee, instead, is the in-
land anchor of the Panhandle’s less-traveled 
eastern stem.  A friend who years ago went 
to grad school there used to describe the city 
as “one-third bureaucrats, one-third students, 
and one-third rednecks.”
Funny, but unfair.  Tallahassee might 
surprise you.  I had a good time at FOTB. 
One night we had a nice dinner downtown 
at the Mockingbird Café, whose waitress 
took loving care of us as we enjoyed a 
good live band and a menu where entrees 
started at Sauteed Grouper and ended at 
Tandoori Cornish Game Hen.  The next day 
I wandered into an independent bookstore 
— the city has several — and came out with 
two books, both published by Tallahassee’s 
Anhinga Press.  Anhinga, starting in the 
1970s with local chapbooks, has made a go 
of poetry ever since.  Among its laurels is the 
annual publication since 2001 of the Levine 
Poetry Prize book — Philip Levine named 
a short time ago as the United States Poet 
Laureate.  A memorable line in one of my 
Anhinga books is the opening stanza from a 
poem about the convergence of tabloid and 
mainstream culture, “Denver Man Shot by 
Golden Retriever.”
America runs fictional these days, 
my mama says.
FOTB was held at Tallahassee’s best 
known university, Florida State (the city is 
also home to Florida A&M and Tallahassee 
Community College), an institution best 
known for its football team, the Seminoles. 
FSU might surprise you too, though.  At the 
library school, emeritus professor Wayne 
Wiegand is the principal biographer of Mel-
vil Dewey.  The English Department houses 
a number of luminaries, most prominently 
Robert Olen Butler, winner of a Pulitzer 
Prize for fiction, and also one of my favorite 
poets, Barbara Hamby (who did not write 
the poem above, which can instead be found 
in Yellowjackets, by Patti White).  There’s 
an interdisciplinary program at FSU called 
History of Text Technologies (HoTT), 
whose range is “cave paintings to personal 
computers,” with courses for graduate and 
undergraduate students to study anything 
from “ a twelfth-century lyric poet and ro-
mancer within the context of the troubadour 
and romance traditions,” to the “biopolitics 
of postcolonial mobile phone networks,” with 
quite a lot of other ground covered in between 
this pair of historical moments, as platforms 
for reading, writing, and communicating 
have succeeded and superseded, collided 
and co-existed with one another across the 
millennia.
The point is that Tallahassee is more than 
a place where famous football players like 
Deion Sanders learn their trade.  It is also 
home to the people who make up a vibrant 
local book community.  Since our best clues 
to the future of the book will have to come 
from the present of the book, why not Tal-
lahassee?
For two days the present-day book was 
well represented across the thirty presenta-
tions comprising the FOTB program about 
the book’s future.  Academic librarians had 
their say.  So did deans, scholars, and stu-
dents.  Publishers stood up, also booksellers 
and novelists.  Consultants spoke.  Futurists 
and technologists looked ahead from their 
seats for the benefit of the one hundred or so 
conference attendees.  Current library techni-
cal services issues were one window into the 
future.  Today’s eBooks were of course more 
frequently called upon as a way to divine 
what’s ahead.  E-readers, artist books, text-
books, children’s books, and books of other 
kinds all were examined too.
However FOTB was bookended, so to 
speak, by two talks which mapped the poles 
representing what probably amount to the 
most and least embracing attitudes you could 
possibly express at an academic conference 
today, on the notion that the book as we have 
known it is going away soon if not in some 
ways already gone.  The coordinates of ev-
eryone else were somewhere between those 
of two “featured speakers” at FOTB, Elaine 
Treharne and Bob Stein.
A professor in the English department 
and also active in FSU’s HoTT program, 
Treharne spoke early on day one.  She spe-
cializes in medieval manuscripts and book 
history and has the kind of scholarly record 
that gets one invited to become a Fellow of 
the Royal Historical Society, which had 
happened to her not long before FOTB.  At 
the podium she switched between the learned 
manner one would expect from a distin-
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Street, published in 1873, remains one of the 
classic treatments of the role of the central bank 
in the management of financial crises.”13  As a 
scholar of the Great Depression, Bernanke was 
determined to maintain the flow of credit in the 
United States and also internationally.  Perry 
Mehrling points out in The New Lombard Street 
just how far the Fed has pushed the lender of 
last resort principle to save the international 
financial system by extending credit to money 
market funds, the commercial paper market, 
asset-backed securities, and even by purchasing 
mortgage-backed securities to prevent a total 
collapse of the housing market.14  The crisis has 
forced the Fed to become a market maker or, as 
Mehrling argues, “The Dealer of Last Resort.” 
The lasting influence of Bagehot’s Lombard 
Street is clear.  It continues to inform economic 
policy and theory and is a classic, yet ever-current 
work for a library collection covering econom-
ics.  This and the other works discussed here 
offer finance and business students important 
scholarly perspectives on past, present, and the 
almost-certain future financial crises.  
